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ABSTRACT
Resilience is held as a promising concept to produce a paradigm shift
from traditional ﬂood control to an integration of ﬂood risk
management and spatial planning. Central ideas to the resilience
narrative are that ‘nothing is certain except uncertainty itself’ and
‘adaptability’ is key to ‘governing the unknown’. However, this
terminology is far from clear, yet increasingly used, which raises the
question how it is made sense of in practice. To answer this
question, we examine two long-term ﬂood risk management
strategies in the London and Rotterdam region with a policy
framing perspective (i.e. the English Thames Estuary 2100 Plan and
the Dutch Delta Programme). In both strategies, uncertainties are a
key concern, leading to adaptive strategic plans. Reconstructing the
framing processes shows that the English adopted a ‘scientiﬁc
pragmatism’ frame and the Dutch a ‘joint fact-ﬁnding’ frame. While
this led to diﬀerent governance approaches, there are also striking
parallels. Both cases use established methods such as scenario
planning and monitoring to ‘manage’ uncertainties. Similarly to
previous turns in ﬂood risk management, the resilience narrative
seems to be accommodated in a technical-rational way, resulting in
policy strategies that are maintaining the status quo rather than
bringing about a paradigm shift.
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1. Introduction
The concept of resilience has recently gained popularity in academic as well as policy dis-
courses, in particular in relation to climate change and ﬂood risk management (Davoudi,
Brooks, & Mehmood, 2013; Scott, 2013; White, 2010). Evans and Reid (2014) speak of a
‘resilience turn’ in governmental thinking. The resilience concept brings a new narrative,
namely that ‘nothing is considered certain except uncertainty itself’ (Davoudi, 2016,
p. 158), raising the question why we should still plan at all (Campbell, 2010). But
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instead of declaring defeat for planning and management, resilience is often framed posi-
tively – more holistic and integrated management approaches aimed at ‘adaptation’ and
building ‘adaptive capacity’ seem to be key to ‘governing the unknown’. However, all
this terminology is far from clear, yet increasingly used, which raises the question how
it is made sense of in practice. Speciﬁcally, this paper examines how two key notions of
the resilience narrative – ‘uncertainties’ and ‘adaptability’ – are operationalized in ﬂood
risk management strategies in the regions of London and Rotterdam.
This is interesting to study for two reasons. First, ﬂood risk management is a policy ﬁeld
with a long-standing ‘technocratic culture’ (Lintsen, 2002; van den Brink, 2009), generally
known for its ‘predict and control’ regime (Pahl-Wostl, 2006). Currently, however, ﬂood
risk management is shifting towards more integrated and adaptive modes of governance,
accepting uncertainties as an ‘unavoidable fact of life’ (Brugnach, Dewulf, Pahl-Wostl, &
Taillieu, 2008). Second, with a growing body of literature on resilience, the number of cri-
tiques and concerns regarding the actual usage of the concept in practice has also increased
(e.g. Chandler, 2014; Cote & Nightingale, 2012; Davoudi, 2012; Davoudi, 2016; Evans &
Reid, 2014; Porter & Davoudi, 2012; White & O’Hare, 2014). So far, however, most of
these concerns are elaborated conceptually, instead of providing empirical proof. We
aim to ﬁll this gap in the literature by studying the meaning-making process in two
speciﬁc ﬂood risk management strategies (i.e. the Thames Estuary 2100 Plan and the
Dutch Delta Programme).
In the regions of London and Rotterdam, key actors from governmental agencies have
pioneered with long-term policy strategies in which dealing with uncertainties are a core
concern. In the London region, the Thames Estuary 2100 Plan1 aims at tackling tidal
ﬂood risk until 2100. In the Rotterdam Region, policy-makers have translated the national
‘Adaptive Delta Management’ approach into a regional strategy that aims at guaranteeing
ﬂood protection as well as freshwater supply until 2100. These policy strategies are novelties
in themselves, as they span across a long time horizon (until 2100) and claim to be ‘adap-
tive’ to deal with uncertainties arising, amongst others factors, from climate change. These
cases are interesting to compare, because they are similar in their ambition and their chal-
lenges, but diﬀer in their institutional frameworks and cultures. Moreover, we can assess
how the resilience narrative unfolds in two (national) contexts, and to what extent their
interpretations indeed can be seen as a ‘resilience turn’ in ﬂood risk management practice.
In analysing both strategies, we adopted a discursive approach, as they introduce a new
policy language with terms such as ‘adaptation pathways’, ‘tipping points’ and ‘route-map
approach’. More precisely, we analysed the two strategic plans with a policy framing per-
spective. Framing emphasizes how people strategically make sense of ambiguous and
complex situations; a policy frame sets out a course of action to address a problematic
policy situation (Rein & Laws, 2000). We analysed policy documents, carried out inter-
views with key actors and observed some of their meetings to deconstruct the framing
process in both cases, unravelling how uncertainties are framed in the ﬁrst place and
how this consequently shaped the course of action brought forward in the policies.
Prior to the empirical analysis, we discuss the implications of the resilience narrative for
ﬂood risk management. We then link resilience to policy framing, arguing that a critical
unpacking of the resilience concept in ﬂood risk management practice is needed. After
reconstructing the framing processes in both cases, we discuss to what extent their operatio-
nalization of the resilience narrative actually ﬁts to the idea of a paradigm shift usually
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associated with ﬂood resilience. Finally, we reﬂect on the added value of interpretative
approaches for analysing the usage of resilience thinking in ﬂood risk management practice.
2. Resilience and ﬂood risk management: a paradigm shift or two worlds
colliding?
In ﬂood risk management, resilience is associated with the paradigm shift from technical
ﬂood protection to more holistic kinds of ﬂood risk management, emphasizing spatial
planning as a means to reduce the vulnerability of the hinterland (Restemeyer, Woltjer,
& van den Brink, 2015; Scott, 2013; White, 2010). Resilience, however, is not a straightfor-
ward concept; it can be interpreted in multiple ways. Davoudi (2012) has categorized the
diﬀerent understandings of resilience in three strands, namely engineering, ecological and
evolutionary resilience. Evolutionary resilience is held most promising to inform govern-
ance in general and planning and ﬂood risk management in particular (Chandler, 2014;
Davoudi, 2012; Scott, 2013; White & O’Hare, 2014). Contrary to the other resilience
understandings, which assume the possibility of an equilibrium state that can be returned
to, evolutionary resilience emphasizes the dynamics and complexity of the system, making
a return to a previous state impossible, and therefore arguing for the need to transform in
response to stresses and strains (Boschma, 2015; Davoudi, 2012; Simmie & Martin, 2010;
White & O’Hare, 2014). For ﬂood risk management, evolutionary resilience entails a new
way of thinking evolving around four main points: (1) social-ecological systems thinking is
introduced to ﬂood risk management, (2) a key assumption is that uncertainties are inevi-
table, (3) strategies need to be ﬂexible to respond to sudden changes as well as gradual
long-term trends, (4) a diversity of ﬂood risk management measures is required to
prevent ﬂood damages.
First, evolutionary resilience thinking emphasizes that social and ecological systems are
strongly intertwined, forming social-ecological systems (Davoudi, 2012; Folke et al., 2010).
Applied to ﬂood risk management, social-ecological systems’ thinking implies a broader
scope than before. The considered system is not limited to the water system and the
ﬂood defences, but also includes ﬂoodplains and areas behind the ﬂood defences. Flood
risk management then takes into account physical as well as socio-economic aspects,
such as the existence of embankments, elevation diﬀerences, soil characteristics, land
use, the institutional and political system and population characteristics (de Bruijn, 2005).
Second, a key assumption related to social-ecological systems’ thinking is the inevitabil-
ity of uncertainties. Resilience thinking suggests that social-ecological systems are inher-
ently complex, because all parts of the system are interrelated and continuously evolve,
by themselves and by the interaction with each other (Folke et al., 2010; Goldstein, Wes-
sells, Lejano, & Butler, 2015). The emergent character of all parts as well as their non-linear
interlinkages make the system fundamentally unpredictable (Chandler, 2014; Davoudi,
2012; Mitchell, 2009). For ﬂood risk management, this means that next to ‘knowing too
little’ due to incomplete knowledge (e.g. ‘To what level will this dike resist?’) and
‘knowing too diﬀerently’ due to diverging stakeholder perceptions and interests, a third
type of uncertainty arises, which requires ‘accepting not to know’ (Brugnach et al.,
2008). This type of uncertainty can relate to the physical as well as the social system,
e.g. the unknown eﬀects of climate change on weather extremes or stakeholders’ reactions
to the next ﬂood in a speciﬁc area (Brugnach et al., 2008).
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Third, although deep uncertainties make it diﬃcult to foresee the outcomes of any plan-
ning or policy attempt, the resilience narrative also includes a positive connotation: ‘adap-
tability’ or building ‘adaptive capacity’ is seen as promising solution to deal with the
unknown (Fikret Berkes, 2007; Davoudi, 2016; Folke, Hahn, Olsson, & Norberg, 2005;
Hurlbert & Gupta, 2016; Mcevoy, Fünfgeld, & Bosomworth, 2013). In relation to ﬂood
risk management, policy-makers can inﬂuence the adaptability of the social-ecological
system in two ways: they can inﬂuence the process as well as the content of policy strat-
egies. In terms of process, adaptability refers to the ﬂexibility of plans and strategies (de
Bruijn, 2005; Restemeyer, van den Brink, & Woltjer, 2016). Strategies can be made in
such a way that they are adaptable to sudden changes as well as gradual long-term
trends (de Bruijn, 2005); for example, by choosing ﬁrst for ‘no-regret measures’,
keeping various options open and leaving room for learning along the way (Haasnoot,
Kwakkel, Walker, & ter Maat, 2013; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2008). A long-term perspective is
needed to make sure that future options are not compromised by short-term actions.
The ﬂexibility of strategies therefore also depends much on the type and timing of
ﬂood risk management measures.
Fourth, in terms of content, a ﬂood resilience approach generally implies a diversity of
ﬂood risk management measures, aimed at the social as well as the ecological side of the
system (Aerts, Botzen, van der Veen, Krywkow, & Werners, 2008; Mees, Driessen, &
Runhaar, 2013; Wardekker, de Jong, Knoop, & van der Sluijs, 2010). The adaptive capacity
of a speciﬁc area can be increased by stimulating a holistic set of ﬂood risk management
measures, trying to reduce the probability as well as the consequences of ﬂooding (Liao,
2014). The probability of ﬂooding can be reduced by traditional ﬂood control measures
such as dikes, dams and sluices as well as providing more space for water (Meijerink &
Dicke, 2008). The consequences of ﬂooding can be reduced by making adjustments in
the hinterland. For example, by keeping vulnerable functions out of ﬂood prone areas,
ﬂood-prooﬁng individual houses or building them as ﬂoatable structures in the ﬁrst
place, and raising ﬂood risk awareness among the population (Restemeyer et al., 2015).
However, many of these ideas are new and require a fundamental shift of a rather tech-
nical policy ﬁeld with long-standing institutions and established objectives. First doubts
are arising whether a diversiﬁcation of ﬂood risk management measures is necessarily
better; diﬀerent geographical and institutional characteristics might make one type of
ﬂood risk management measure more important than another (Hegger et al., 2016).
Additionally, a valid question is if a region can really be good at everything. The idea of
‘adaptability’ and how it can be achieved is also contested, manifested in a growing
body of literature surrounding terms such as ‘adaptive governance’ (e.g. Folke et al.,
2005), ‘adaptive planning’ (e.g. Wilkinson, 2012), ‘adaptive management’ (e.g. Allen, Fon-
taine, Pope, & Garmestani, 2011) and ‘adaptive co-management’ (e.g. Berkes, Armitage, &
Doubleday, 2007). Nonetheless, many related terms, including resilience, adaptive
capacity and complex systems, are taken up quickly by policy-makers, even though they
are multi-interpretable and diﬃcult to operationalize.
Therefore, a more practice-based approach is needed, examining how practitioners
make sense of ‘the system’ and ‘uncertainties’ in their everyday practice, and how they
give meaning to the idea of ‘adaptability’ as the potential solution for these uncertainties.
Language is crucial in this process, because, as White and O’Hare (2014, p. 945) point out
in relation to the diﬀerent understandings of resilience: ‘Even where more “adaptive”
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language is used, it may also be enveloped within an engineered understanding’. While an
engineering understanding of resilience is more in line with maintaining the status quo, an
evolutionary understanding builds on the need for transformation (White & O’Hare,
2014). Considering the diﬀerent interpretations of resilience, it is important to grasp
which interpretations are used in new ﬂood risk management strategies.
3. The importance of policy framing
Framing is about language in use; a process of meaning-making among various actors to
understand a certain event, process or occurrence (Mcevoy et al., 2013; Schön & Rein,
1994). Weick (1995) therefore calls frames ‘sense-making devices’. Language can shape
our understanding of certain topics, in particular if these topics are complex and ambig-
uous (Hajer, 2011). The framing of a problem will ultimately shape the course of action
that is set out. Hence, framing aﬀects politics and human behaviour.
Linkages between resilience and framing have been made before (e.g. Aldunce, Beilin,
Handmer, & Howden, 2014; Mcevoy et al., 2013). Due to the multi-interpretable nature of
the resilience concept, various authors have stressed the need for critically unpacking how
the resilience concept is used in practice (Cote & Nightingale, 2012; Davoudi, 2012; Hare
& White, 2013; Porter & Davoudi, 2012). Above all, this critical unpacking is needed
because of potential frictions between the evolutionary resilience narrative and the narra-
tives used in long-standing institutions; i.e. long-standing institutions will less likely
embrace a highly transformative concept such as evolutionary resilience (White &
O’Hare, 2014). Coming from the natural sciences, the resilience concept bears the risk
of ‘depoliticizing’ social structures and power relations (Keck & Sakdapolrak, 2013;
Pelling & Manuel-Navarrete, 2011). Other authors have hinted at the potential danger
of using the resilience narrative to justify austerity measures and government’s retreat
(Chandler, 2014; Davoudi, 2016; Evans & Reid, 2014).
We speciﬁcally focus on policy framing (Schön & Rein, 1994). Policy framing originally
refers to diverging frames of involved stakeholders, explaining the mismatch between
policy implementation and policy intent (Schön & Rein, 1994). Over the last decades,
though, policy framing has further developed from a rather static understanding of
frames as ‘knowledge structures’ or ‘mental schemes’ to a more interactional, dynamic
and political approach to framing (Dewulf et al., 2009; van Hulst & Yanow, 2016; van
Lieshout, Dewulf, Aarts, & Termeer, 2012). Besides, framing can have an ‘agenda-
setting character’ (Mcevoy et al., 2013), usually taking place at a strategic level (van den
Brink, 2009). The latter ﬁts with our object of analysis, as the two ﬂood risk management
strategies are in an early stage attempting to manage ﬂood risk over a long time period. We
are therefore interested in how a group of key actors, in an interactive process, arrive at a
shared meaning of a certain problem and deﬁne a new course of action.
During a framing process certain aspects will be highlighted, while others are down-
played to get a grasp on an otherwise overwhelmingly complex reality. Entman (1993,
p. 52) calls this a process of ‘selection’ and ‘salience’. Framing also entails ‘narrating’,
binding all salient features together in a coherent story (van Hulst & Yanow, 2016).
Common narrating elements are how the present situation has been shaped by the past
and what needs to be done in the future. By narrating, an energizing and enacting
frame is created, which can be understood as a socially constructed guide for doing and
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acting (van den Brink, 2009). Rein and Laws (2000, p. 93) have deﬁned a policy frame
more speciﬁcally as ‘a normative-prescriptive story that sets out a problematic policy
problem and a course of action to be taken to address the problematic situation’ (from
‘is’ to ‘ought’).
Linking the conceptualization of a policy frame to the resilience narrative, two elements
are crucial for our analysis. First, how the problem is deﬁned in the strategic plans, that is,
how the system is interpreted, how uncertainties are understood and which uncertainties
are made most salient. Second, which course of action is set out in the strategies, in par-
ticular how key actors involved in these strategies interpret and operationalize an adaptive
management approach. As a course of action usually sets out a process (how to do it?) as
well as potential measures (what to do?), we will pay attention to what extent the strategies
are adaptive to changing circumstances (process) and to what extent they attempt to build
adaptive capacity on land (content).
4. Methodology: analysis of policy frames
We chose to study the Thames Estuary 2100 Plan (TE2100 Plan) in England and the Delta
Programme (DP) in the Netherlands. Both make dealing with uncertainties a central
theme, leading to an ‘adaptable plan’ in the English case and the ‘Adaptive Delta Manage-
ment’ (ADM) approach in the Dutch case. However, the two plans have been realized in
diﬀerent national contexts, each with their own institutional frameworks and cultures. A
comparison of both approaches is interesting, as it can show the inﬂuence of two diﬀerent
national and regional contexts on the operationalization of an adaptive strategic plan.
Similarities are assumed because the DP was inspired by the TE2100 Plan (Jeuken &
Reeder, 2011). The TE 2100 Project started in 2002, led by the Environment Agency
(EA). The DP was launched only in 2010. Before that, Dutch policy-makers had the
chance to visit various water management practices in diﬀerent countries. England’s
TE2100 Plan has left a lasting impression and therefore inﬂuenced the Dutch ADM
approach. The current DP is actually a follow-up of the ﬁrst DP, which was established
after the storm surge of 1953, leading to the so-called Delta Works.
A diﬀerence between the two cases is that the Dutch case is a programme, whereas the
English case is a plan. They are still comparable, though, because both can be considered
strategic policies. Both are a statement of intent, setting out a strategic course of action
coordinating several policy actions and interventions over a time horizon until 2100.
The strategic courses of action developed in both regions are signed by the respective
national government, making them the guiding frameworks for future decisions. Still,
there were slight diﬀerences, which we had to take into account in our analysis.
On the one hand, the DP is a national policy programme whereas the English case only
spans across the Thames Estuary. On the other hand, the DP pursues to ensure ﬂood pro-
tection and freshwater supply, whereas the TE2100 Plan predominantly attempts to
manage tidal ﬂood risk. To make the two cases comparable, we merely focussed on the
ﬂood risk element in the Dutch case. Moreover, we speciﬁcally studied the regional
sub-programme Rijnmond-Drechtsteden which comprises the Rotterdam region, to
ensure that we could compare potential regional/local implications. We also chose for
the Rotterdam region, because it is to a large degree comparable to the London region
in terms of ﬂood risk and socio-economic signiﬁcance.
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In both cases, we used three methods to deconstruct the framing processes: policy
document analysis (published as well as unpublished), semi-structured interviews and
participatory observation. We chose to study policy documents as they capture the
results of the preceding negotiation processes among the policy-makers. In the English
case, we examined the TE2100 Plan as well as the publicly unavailable Technical Report
(387 pages) and all its appendices. In the Dutch case, the national level set some major
guidelines, while the regional level was responsible for substantiating and applying
these in the sub-programme Rijnmond-Drechtsteden. Therefore, we examined the
national guideline for implementing ADM, yearly progress reports from the national
DP as well as yearly reports from the regional subprogramme Rijnmond-Drechtsteden
(see appendix for overview of policy documents).
Supplementary to the document analysis, the semi-structured interviews with key
actors involved in the strategic policy processes provided a deeper understanding of the
underlying process and mechanism of the policies. Particularly, because the interviews
gave us an insight into the speciﬁc meaning of certain words and the backgrounds and
beliefs of the actors involved in the policy processes. . In the English case, we interviewed
six key actors: two central persons in the ‘EA in-house team’ involved in making the TE
2100 Plan (one from the EA, one from an external consultancy agency), three working on
the implementation of the TE2100 Plan at that time (all from the EA, one particularly on
asset management, one on ﬂoodplain management, and another one working as planning
advisor for the local boroughs) and one representative from the Greater London Authority
who had regularly been consulted during the development phase of the plan. In the Dutch
case, we interviewed eight key actors: two from the national DP (the founder of the ADM
concept working at the Ministry for Infrastructure and Environment and the external
advisor for ADM from a consultancy agency) and six from the regional programme
team (the regional programme director and ﬁve programme team members who were
involved in the ADM strategy of the subprogramme, either working at the Ministry of
Infrastructure and Environment, the executive water management agency ‘Rijkswater-
staat’ or at a consultancy agency).
The participatory observation in both cases helped us to understand how the more
general ideas were translated to and ‘made sense of’ among government oﬃcials on a
regional/local level. For the Dutch case, because the strategy development phase was
still ongoing, we attended several working sessions of the regional programme team
between December 2013 and May 2014, during which we could observe how the
meaning-making process actually took place. For the English case, we attended a work-
shop organized by the EA in July 2015, observing how the EA explained the implications
of the TE2100 Plan to the local boroughs of London and how the boroughs reacted to the
plan’s implications. Our level of participation in both cases can be considered ‘moderate’
(see Hennink, Hutter, & Bailey, 2011). In both cases our role as a researcher was known.
We were sitting at the same table as the other participants. In the Dutch case, we became
part of the programme team’s email list and therefore received all documents and minutes
of their meetings. In the English case, we received the minutes of the workshop and related
documents (such as the results of a survey among the local boroughs regarding the
implementation of the TE2100 Plan). However, we did not actively participate in the dis-
cussions to keep enough distance to our object of analysis and thus ensure our objectivity
as a researcher. During the interviews as well as the observations, we proﬁted from our role
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as an ‘outsider’ to the policy process, because we were in the position to ask people for
clariﬁcations of certain words, abbreviations and metaphors, which had become ‘everyday
jargon’ for them. That way, the interviews and the observations helped to better under-
stand and contextualize speciﬁc contents of the document analysis.
In our analysis, we followed a two-step procedure. First, we started coding the policy
documents and the interview transcripts with the help of Atlas.TI. In this phase, we
ﬁrst selected those text passages that either described the ‘system’ or addressed ‘uncertain-
ties’. Moreover, we selected those text segments that said something about ‘adaptability’,
paying attention to the adaptability of the strategies in terms of process as well as content.
Subsequently, we studied the selected text segments in depth, paying attention to the
speciﬁc choice of words, relation between words and which elements are made most
salient. By distilling the main story line, we identiﬁed the underlying policy frames. In
both cases, the reconstructed policy frame stems from the common denominator in
these strategies for how to achieve adaptability.
5. The TE2100 Plan: the ‘scientiﬁc pragmatism’ frame
The TE2100 Plan was signed by the central government, namely by the Department for
the Environment, Food and Rural Aﬀairs (DEFRA) and the Treasury. It was oﬃcially
adopted in 2012. Since then, it is one of the many plans concerning ﬂood risk in the
Thames Estuary. It has the same strategic character as a Catchment Management Plan,
yet it entails more detailed strategies and explicit links with spatial planning initiatives.
In pursuit of an adaptable TE2100 plan, a ‘scientiﬁc pragmatism’ frame was adopted, as
we will show in the remainder of this section.
5.1. Managing uncertainties by ‘sound science’?
The Thames Estuary is described as ‘a dynamic, ever-changing system which through this
century will face increasing and new challenges’ (TE2100 Plan, p. 25). The plan presents
ﬁve challenges, namely climate change, future socio-economic developments, the deterio-
ration rate of existing ﬂood defences, changes in the physical environment (e.g. soil sub-
sidence), and a low public awareness of ﬂood risks. At the same time, these challenges
represent the main uncertainties mentioned in the plan.
On the one hand, the TE2100 Plan highlights that uncertainties are inevitable. For
example, the technical report of the TE2100 Plan (p. 4) stresses that ‘the fact remains
that any people and property in the ﬂoodplain will always remain at risk of ﬂooding
however solid and extensive the defences may be’. Moreover, the Thames Estuary is
described in terms of a social-ecological system. Besides mentioning its dynamic and
emerging character, the Thames Estuary is labelled as ‘a successful compromise of a thriv-
ing man-made landscape coexisting with a rich and diverse estuarine environment’
(TE2100 Plan, p. 25), stressing the inﬂuence of human and ecological factors alike.
On the other hand, the TE2100Plan also reassures that it is possible to dealwith uncertain-
ties: ‘We cannot knowwhat the future holds but we have assembled the evidence showing the
demands that will be made on our ﬂood risk management system through changing climate,
socio economic change and the fragile natural environment’ (TE2100 Plan, Technical Report,
p. xxiv). Uncertainties about climate change and socio-economic developments are made
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most salient, with climate change as ‘the greatest challenge in terms of future uncertainty’
(TE2100 Plan, p. 25). For both, working with scenarios is seen as a solution. Furthermore,
the emphasis lies on ‘sound science’, building an ‘evidence base’, and carrying out ‘studies’
and ‘investigations’ to build a ‘ﬁrm foundation’ for the plan, which can be linked back to
the technical nature of ﬂood risk management: ‘We have built up a comprehensive evidence
base of data and resultswithover 300 studies and investigations. This evidence provides aﬁrm
foundation to our TE2100 Plan’ (TE2100 Plan, p. 40).
The strong focus on generating more knowledge in the light of deep uncertainties is
somewhat paradoxical (see section 2). This paradox becomes more clear when looking
at how the involved actors aim to create an ‘adaptable plan’.
5.2. An ‘adaptable plan’ – scientiﬁc pragmatism at its best?
The idea behind an ‘adaptable plan’ is that interventions to manage tidal ﬂood risk can be
adjusted to changing circumstances over the 100 year time span of the plan. For this
purpose, the TE2100 Plan promotes several smaller interventions over a longer time
period instead of one single intervention, e.g. a large-scale storm surge barrier at the
opening of the Thames Estuary. That way, the plan is argued to be ‘adaptable to a changing
climate to ensure that the actions that are taken are the right ones, taken at the right time
and will not waste money on over-engineered solutions’ (TE2100 Plan, p. 29).
To recognize when intervention is needed, the plan suggests monitoring ‘ten key indi-
cators’, also referred to as ‘triggers for change’. These indicators comprise hard and soft
indicators, ranging from ‘mean sea level rise’ to ‘land use planning and development
activities’ and ‘public/institutional attitudes to ﬂood risk’. The outcomes from this moni-
toring programme should inform the regular reviews of the plan and trigger decision-
making if rapid change occurs in one or more of the indicators. References to the technical
nature of ﬂood risk management are made. The consultant involved in making the plan
states: ‘well, what happened was, we, being technical, basically it was a technical solution
to a problem’.
The general idea of an adaptable plan has been speciﬁed in a decision-making tool,
referred to as ‘the route-map approach’ and ‘decision pathlines’ by our interviewees.
The plan itself shows this approach for two diﬀerent ﬂood risk management options in
the Thames Estuary, called ‘maintaining the existing system’ and ‘a new barrier’ (see
Figure 1). The ‘decision pathlines’ provide an overview of the interventions belonging
to that particular option, how these interventions can be implemented in stages, and
which indicators have to be kept track of to see when intervention is needed. For each
intervention, the plan presents an implementation point (the moment in time when the
intervention needs to be in place) and a decision point, which lies 10–20 years before
the implementation point to cover for lengthy decision-making processes.
With respect to identifying the options, the consultant involved in making the decision
pathlines explains, though, that ‘in fact a lot of this is pragmatism’. Also the initiator of the
plan considers himself a ‘pragmatic scientist’, thereby stressing both the need for pragma-
tism and the continuing importance of science. A major diﬃculty, though, is putting the
monitoring system into practice. Some indicators, for example mean sea level rise, are
easier to monitor than others (e.g. public/institutional attitudes to ﬂood risk). The main
consultant criticized: ‘[…] quite a lot of the information is around, but some of the
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more diﬃcult things are not being monitored, for example erosion deposition is not being
monitored, and that’s important for the defences’. Another challenge is that merely doing
the monitoring does not yet tell you when to act. The initiator of the plan said: ‘I always
said the risk of this approach is, (…) you will take an optimistic view on the monitoring
and you’ll put oﬀ the decision’. In 2015, the EA was working on reﬁning the monitoring
system to deﬁne the ‘bounds of acceptability’ for each indicator. It also led to the con-
clusion that biophysical indicators (e.g. mean sea level rise) are more thoroughly and fre-
quently monitored than socio-spatial ones (e.g. public/institutional attitudes to ﬂood risk).
5.3. About ‘estuary-wide options’ and ‘ﬂoodplain management’
According to the TE2100 Plan, adaptability is not only related to the timing of interven-
tions, but also the ability to change between options, which refers to the actual content of
the plan. Hinting at building adaptive capacity on land, the TE2100 Plan argues that both
elements of ﬂood risk – probability and consequences – need to be managed. Moreover,
the plan states that they have been very successful in managing the probability of ﬂooding,
while having been less successful in managing the consequence of ﬂooding. The TE2100
Plan then diﬀerentiated between estuary-wide options and ﬂoodplain management.
Searching for estuary-wide options, the EA in-house team identiﬁed 4 high-level options:
(1) improve the existing defences, (2) tidal ﬂood storage, (3) new barrier, (4) new barrier
with locks. From these, option 1 and 3 are presented as ‘frontrunner options’. Comparing
both options (see Figure 1) shows that they are actually identical with the only diﬀerence
Figure 1. The ‘route-map approach’, comparing the ‘frontrunner options’ through the century (Source:
TE2100 Plan, p. 38).
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that option 1 suggests improving the Thames Barrier by 2070, whereas option 3 suggests
building a new barrier by 2070. For the rest, both options suggest the same interventions
and the same timing of these interventions, namely raising upstream and downstream
river defences and using habitat sites for creatingmore space for river water. Option 4, build-
ing a barrier with locks, would be a more extreme version of option 3, building a barrage to
block the tides out. Only option 2, using habitats for tidal ﬂood storage, would be a more
spatial instead of a technical approach to tidal ﬂood risk. Interestingly, this option has
already been ruled out; ‘it is not very realistic’ (interviewee EA, implementation team)
and was eliminated because of doubts ‘about the impact and eﬀectiveness of this measure
in times of long-lasting surge tides’ (interviewee consultant, EA in-house team).
Next to the estuary-wide options, the plan emphasizes the importance of ‘ﬂoodplain
management’ to keep the riverside free from development and leave room for adjustments
in the future. For particular areas, the plan suggests an improved emergency response and
building ﬂood resilience, for instance by ﬂood prooﬁng buildings. However, emergency
response and land use planning lie outside of EA control and depend on the capacities
and willingness of local boroughs and local resilience fora comprising, amongst others,
the ﬁre department and the police. If, and to what extent, ﬂoodplain management will
actually be implemented remains questionable. Local stakeholders, including the local bor-
oughs, often lack the awareness and willingness, as the following quote from an intervie-
wee from the EA shows:
the boroughs just go ‘well, I can’t just put anything in there you know, I’ve got to pick and
choose and I don’t understand why this is that important, we’ve got the barrier, we’re not
worried’.
Local boroughs lack political ‘buy-in’, as ﬂood risk is not a topic (local) politicians are very
interested in. Keeping space free in a city where land and property prices are excelling is
nearly impossible, in particular at the waterfront. Also within the EA, there is a consider-
able mismatch between ‘asset management’ (i.e. the hard infrastructure, ﬂood defences
side) and ‘ﬂoodplain management’ and other resilience-building measures such as
raising awareness, spatial planning and improving emergency response to reduce ﬂood
risk. According to an interviewee from the EA (working for the ﬂoodplain management
side), asset management is ‘where the money is’ and bringing ﬂoodplain management
onto the EA agenda is ‘a bit of a cultural shift for the agency in terms of how it works’.
Overall, the ‘scientiﬁc pragmatism’ frame led to a clear course of action, yet it did not
generate suﬃcient support on local levels, making the implementation of ﬂoodplain man-
agement and other resilience-building measures more diﬃcult.
6. The Dutch Delta Programme: the ‘joint fact-ﬁnding’ frame
The current DP was triggered by increasing concerns about climate change, ﬂood risks and
water shortages. Like the TE2100 Plan, it is an addition to existing policies. The content
was developed in a parallel policy-making process on the national and regional level
between 2010 and June 2014, resulting in national and regional policy strategies for
ﬂood protection and freshwater supply. Decisions from the DP were incorporated into
existing policy instruments, such as the National Water Plan and the Flood Protection
Programme. In developing strategies, a ‘joint fact-ﬁnding’ frame was adopted.
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6.1. Managing uncertainties by ‘joint fact-ﬁnding’?
Uncertainties surrounding climate change, future ﬂood risk and potential water shortages
stand central in the Dutch DP. Contrary to the TE2100 Plan, the DP (2010, p. 68) explicitly
speaks of a complex system, stating that ‘the system is complex and knowledge of many
parts is, by deﬁnition, incomplete’. In that text segment, the system is not deﬁned. In
other parts, however, the word ‘system’ relates to the ‘water system’, which is ‘intercon-
nected’ (DP, 2013, p. 32), as the main water system and the regional water systems
form ‘a cohesive whole’ (DP, 2011, p. 13), put under pressure by climate change and
spatial developments (DP, 2011, p. 68). The emphasis clearly lies on the biophysical
side of the system: the ‘key “controls” in this interconnected water system (…) determine
the playing ﬁeld of solutions’ (DP, 2012, p. 32), with ‘controls’ referring to measures for
discharge distribution.
The DP (2010, p. 68) explicitly states that ‘uncertainty is unavoidable, but can be made
manageable’. The DP followed the English example in making climate change and socio-
economic developments the most salient uncertainties, which are then dealt with by the
so-called ‘Delta Scenarios’. Similarly to the TE2100 Plan, knowledge is seen as ‘a key foun-
dation’ (DP, 2011, p. 45). The Netherland’s position as ‘world leader’ in water manage-
ment, building on ‘expertise amassed over centuries’ is frequently emphasized (DP,
2011, p. 7). However, the DP (2010, p. 44) also stresses that people might have diﬀerent
perspectives on uncertainties and therefore new knowledge needs to be created together:
A collective approach to developing knowledge increases the quality and the support base of
the solutions, which is why (…) considerable importance is attached to such methods as joint
fact-ﬁnding.
The aim of joint fact-ﬁnding is then deﬁned as optimizing ‘the collection and use of knowl-
edge from all stakeholders and to create a broad support base for newly generated knowl-
edge’ (DP, 2010, p.44). The focus on a collaborative effort can be found in the governance
structure. In contrast to the English case, the Dutch DP chose to have several parallel
working groups on the national as well as regional levels, developing strategies for different
topics and areas. Joint fact-ﬁnding also meant that, for each region/topic, several public
servants and organizations operating in the region were invited to several knowledge-
sharing sessions.
6.2. ‘Adaptive Delta Management’
The Dutch DP was inspired by the English ‘route map approach’, developing the ‘Adaptive
Delta Management’ approach, with ‘delta’ to provide a clear Dutch connotation. ADM is
supposed to be ‘a transparent way of including uncertainty around future developments in
decision making’ (DP 2011, p. 48). Similarly to the English, the Dutch DP presented it as a
ﬁnancially responsible, down-to-earth approach, in which intervention should not be tai-
lored to worst-case scenarios. According to the DP (2011, p.45), the approach entails
‘doing what is necessary, neither too much nor too little, while not ruling out future
options’.
Similarly to the English case, adaptability is linked to an economic argument; phasing
strategies and measures is economically beneﬁcial, as investments are spread over time.
The ADM approach was developed by a small group of people on the national level.
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The initiator of the ADM approach joined forces with two economists from diﬀerent con-
sultancy agencies. The consultants were asked to develop the ADM approach further,
searching for methods to enable ‘strategy and decision-making under deep uncertainty’
(subtitle of Handreiking ADM, 2012), while ‘considering the Delta Programme as invest-
ment issue’ (title of the ﬁrst explorative report from one of the consultancies). Economic
methods to deal with uncertainties, in particular ‘real options analysis’, were tested, but
there were too many unknowns to make this method work. They therefore used sophis-
ticated cost–beneﬁt-analyses to evaluate options, labelling it ‘real options thinking’ (inter-
view consultant).
Based on the guidance from the national level, the sub-programmes were asked to apply
ADM in their strategy development. The ﬁnal ‘deliverable’ was to develop ‘adaptation
pathways’, the Dutch equivalent to the English ‘decision pathlines’. For this purpose,
several strategic options were evaluated in terms of costs and beneﬁts, and against a
regional interpretation of the ‘Delta Scenarios’. Strategies were supposed to be ‘robust’
(i.e. working under all scenarios) and ‘ﬂexible’ (i.e. switching to another strategy possible).
In developing the adaptation pathways, attention should also be paid to so-called ‘tipping
points’. Tipping points are moments in time when a measure reaches its ‘sell-by date’ and a
new measure needs to be taken.
According to the initiator, ADM represents an attitudinal shift: ‘what you actually do as
a government, is, you do not emanate that you know everything, but you take the respon-
sibility by portraying the challenge and by being transparent about the uncertainties and
the reasons why you take or post-pone certain decisions’. A member of the programme
team Rijnmond-Drechtsteden renders long-term thinking as the real change; thinking
ahead 100 years gave a feeling of ‘everything is possible’, which ‘broadened the options’.
All interviewees conﬁrmed that the general attitudinal shift made sense to the people in
the sub-programmes; the whole methodology behind ADM, however, was experienced
as ‘diﬃcult’ and ‘complicated’.
The sub-programme Rijnmond-Drechtsteden could not identify tipping points, con-
cluding that ‘today’s system suﬃces’ (Rijnmond-Drechtsteden, 2014); although everything
can be done ‘better, smarter, more eﬃcient, more beautiful, and cheaper’, there is ‘no
moment where you need to change your strategy fundamentally’ (interviewee programme
team member). The visualization of adaptation pathways changed over time from a more
technical representation (similar to the English ‘route-map approach’) to something that
resembles an ‘implementation programme’ (see Figure 2), something that ‘can be
explained to a policy maker within ten minutes’ (interviewee Delta Staﬀ member).
Diﬀerent to the English case, the Dutch have not yet speciﬁed a detailed monitoring
system, but aim to do so in the future (DP, 2014).
To conclude, the Dutch DP attempted to develop a more generic ADM methodology
based on the route-map approach from England, but because of the collaborative set-up
of the DP, it stays closer to the policy-makers world. The top-down initiation of ADM led
to a lack of ownership in applying ADM in the sub-programme Rijnmond-Drechtsteden.
6.3. About ‘adaptive dikes’ and ‘dikes as spatial concepts’
Content-wise, the sub-programmes were asked to ﬁlter strategies over the years. Until
2012, the sub-programme Rijnmond-Drechtsteden developed ﬁve so-called ‘possible
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strategies’ (Rijnmond-Drechtsteden, 2012). In 2013, they distilled two ‘promising strat-
egies’ (Rijnmond-Drechtsteden, 2013), before presenting the ﬁnal ‘preferred strategy’ in
2014. Accordingly, there was little time between thinking broad (‘everything was possible’,
see section 2) and setting out a preferred course of action.
Large-scale engineering options (such as closing of the sea with a closed dam) and more
ecology-friendly options (i.e. opening up parts of the defence line towards the sea) were
quickly ruled out. Interestingly, only one of the ﬁve possible strategies (i.e. ‘dealing diﬀer-
ently with water’) looked beyond merely the water system, focusing on reducing the con-
sequences of ﬂooding by spatial planning and disaster management measures. In that
respect, the narrow deﬁnition of the system (as ‘interconnected water system’, see
Section 6.1) clearly inﬂuenced the strategy development.
The preferred strategy for the Rotterdam region focusses on optimizing today’s strat-
egy, which implies ﬁrst and foremost increasing protection levels. Dikes as well as
sluices and barriers are supposed to be continuously improved. Creating more space for
rivers is generally considered a useful measure, yet, within the preferred strategy, it is
merely held eﬀective in one part of the region (i.e. river Merwede). A stronger focus on
reducing consequences through ﬂood-adapted building and evacuation measures is
suggested only for the few unembanked areas (e.g. Stadshavens in Rotterdam) and the
Island of Dordrecht (the second biggest city in the Rijmond-Drechtsteden region). Unem-
banked areas lie outside of today’s defence system, and the Island of Dordrecht had already
started experimenting with a more holistic approach to water before the DP actually
started (van Herk et al., 2011).
Figure 2. ‘Adaptation pathway’ from sub-programme Rijnmond-Drechtsteden (Source: translated from
Rijnmond-Drechtsteden, 2014).
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Still, the DP (2012, p. 11) emphasizes that ‘ﬂood risk management is a complex area and
forms a linked issue with spatial planning’. This link is also emphasized in Rijnmond-
Drechtsteden’s ﬁnal advice (2014, p. 6), although they start reasoning from dikes: ‘We
see every dike as a spatial concept and an opportunity to integrate the dike better into
its spatial surrounding.’ For example, most dikes in the city of Rotterdam shall become
‘strong urban dikes’ that enable waterfront development because the dike itself can
include shops or parking garages. That way, they make a predominately preventive strat-
egy sound more spatially contextualized. It will not increase the adaptive capacity of the
hinterland, though. The ﬂood risk management strategy remains basically the same, it
is only decorated diﬀerently.
The preferred strategy is considered adaptive, because it requires only gradual adjust-
ments to the existing system (Rijnmond-Drechtsteden, 2014). Following this line of
reasoning, one of our interviewees from Rijnmond-Drechtsteden framed also dikes as
being adaptive:
I think the advantage of today’s system is that it is already quite adaptive. A dike is vastly
adaptive; (…) every year you add a layer of asphalt on top and it is already enough. Not extre-
mely adaptive in that sense, (…) but with the dikes we have already adapted the last 300
years.
Overall, the ‘joint fact-ﬁnding’ frame in the Dutch case fostered a different governance
approach than the TE2100 Plan, but there are striking parallels between the preferred
strategies for the Rotterdam and London region. The variety of options got quickly nar-
rowed down and optimizing the existing ﬂood defence system eventually stood out as
most promising and cost-efﬁcient strategy in both cases. Interestingly, in the Rotterdam
case the meaning-making process resulted in the conclusion that the existing system
has been adaptive all along.
7. Discussion
Both cases show that the emergence of ‘adaptive’ long-term ﬂood risk management strat-
egies is accompanied by a new policy language, emphasizing ‘uncertainties’ and ‘intercon-
nected systems’ and introducing terms such as the ‘route-map approach’ and ‘adaptation
pathways’. The Dutch DP uses language that can more clearly be related to evolutionary
resilience (e.g. ‘complex system’ and ‘tipping points’). In the English case, this terminology
is less prevalent, but still detectable (notion of a ‘social-ecological system’, inevitability of
uncertainties).
The framing of uncertainties diﬀers slightly between the two cases. Although the same
uncertainties are made salient (i.e. climate change and socio-economic development), the
Dutch DP also stresses the existence of multiple perspectives and diﬀering views, leading
to a more collective governance approach than in the English case. This is likely to be cul-
turally motivated, as it builds on the tradition of the ‘Dutch polder model’, emphasizing
decision-making based on building consensus (Ashworth, Graham, & Tunbridge, 2007).
The TE2100 Plan on the other hand puts stronger emphasis on additional studies and
investigations to gain more knowledge about the estuary and improve the evidence
base. This conceptualization ﬁts well into the English policy-making context, with its
general push for ‘evidence-based policy-making’ (Clarence, 2002), and into English
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ﬂood risk management, which has been characterized with ‘lost knowledge’ and ‘out-
sourced expertise’ (Haughton, Bankoﬀ, & Coulthard, 2015, p. 375). In both cases, the
interpretation of uncertainties hence depends on the national context and the respective
ﬂood risk management debates.
Strikingly, both cases return to scenario planning as a means to deal with uncertainties,
which was already introduced to strategic planning in the 1970s (Chakraborty & McMil-
lan, 2015). The power of scenarios is to think in multiple futures, and prepare diﬀerent
courses of action accordingly. In that sense, it is interesting that both cases have striven
for a bandwidth of options, yet quickly narrowed them down to the option that keeps
the existing strategy and system more or less in place. Although keeping the system in
place might prove to be a good choice, it also begs the question if representatives from gov-
ernmental authorities – being part of this existing system – are able to take a broader view.
Gralepois et al. (2016) refer to this as the ‘stickiness of the technocentric policy regime’.
Similarly, the framing of adaptability is more process- than content-oriented in both
cases. Adaptability is mainly framed as phasing diﬀerent interventions over time; these
interventions, however, are mostly aimed at lowering the probability of ﬂooding, less on
managing the consequences of ﬂooding. Building adaptive capacity behind the existing
ﬂood defence systems is rarely mentioned. The preferred strategies focus more on conver-
sation instead of transformation. Notably, both cases assume that they can know when to
switch to another intervention or even a fundamentally diﬀerent course of action, postu-
lating a certain degree of predictability. In the English case, this thought is given form in
terms of a rather detailed monitoring system. However, this case also shows that operatio-
nalizing such a monitoring system is rather diﬃcult (i.e. are the relevant indicators mon-
itored in the right way?). Framed as a ‘technical solution to a problem’, it comes across
rather ‘depoliticized’, although if and how monitoring results are acted upon remains a
political choice.
Operationalizing adaptability in such a way oﬀers several advantages. It builds on long-
standing institutions and competencies. Moreover, ﬂood risk management remains orga-
nized as a public good, providing ‘protection for all’. On the other hand, postponing pol-
itical choices leads to ﬁnancial uncertainty: who guarantees that there will be enough
money for future interventions? Eventually, the biggest uncertainty might actually stem
from within the systems associated with the policy cases discussed, instead of outside of it.
Although we can see an adoption of resilience language in both policies, manifested in
the emphasis on uncertainties and the emergence of ‘adaptive’ strategies, the changes in
actual practice are so far less fundamental than evolutionary resilience would suggest.
Up to now, the newly introduced ‘resilience narrative’ is accommodated in a rather tech-
nical-rational way, using established methods such as scenario planning and monitoring
to ‘manage’ uncertainties. Interestingly, other authors have shown that previous ‘turns’ in
ﬂood risk management have been accommodated in a similar way. In relation to Dutch
ﬂood risk management, Lintsen (2002) showed that the ‘ecological turn’ during the
1960s was translated to ecological norms and standards, whereas van den Brink (2009,
p. 245) concluded that the ‘managerial turn’ during the 1980s was incorporated
through ‘performance indicators, targets, norms, standards, service level agreements,
benchmarks, assessments, accounting procedures’. In this light, the emergence of ‘adap-
tive’ ﬂood risk management strategies as a marker of a ‘resilience turn’ shows similarities
with previous turns.
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8. Conclusions
Overall, we can conclude that while the resilience concept is gaining prominence, its con-
ceptual fuzziness leaves enough room for policy-makers to interpret it in their own way.
Analysing the framing processes of ﬂood risk management strategies in the London and
Rotterdam region shows that resilience is far from ‘depoliticized’, as other authors have
already mentioned (Keck & Sakdapolrak, 2013; Pelling & Manuel-Navarrete, 2011). If
and how resilience thinking is adopted, is inﬂuenced by a discursive process and often
requires political choices. We therefore argue that interpretive policy analysis is an ade-
quate method to unravel the meaning-making process in practice, paying attention to
who has the power to exert inﬂuence, and also who stays in power.
Analysing the meaning-making process for two speciﬁc long-term ﬂood risk manage-
ment strategies reveals that, up to now, there is more an inclination towards maintaining
and improving the existing system instead of transformating it. In that way, our ﬁndings
are in line with White and O’Hare’s (2014) statement that adaptive language can be envel-
oped in an engineered understanding. Moreover, based on these two cases, we conclude
that the economic argument has gained importance. Both cases stress the importance
to avoid over- and underinvestment; with the Dutch using economic thinking as a basis
for the ADM approach. Although this ‘economic turn’ is not yet accompanied by govern-
ment retreat, a concern raised by other authors (Chandler, 2014; Davoudi, 2016; Evans &
Reid, 2014), this development needs to be closely monitored in the future. Especially con-
sidering the public value of ﬂood risk management, it is interesting to examine to what
extent this ‘economic turn’ occurs in other institutional and political contexts. In the
English case, we can already see that ‘ﬂoodplain management’ and other resilience-build-
ing measures are downscaled to a lower level, although these lower tiers often lack the
necessary knowledge, resources and power to implement these measures.
The above mentioned concerns raise the question to what extent the resilience concept
is commensurable with ﬂood risk management as a public good and value. An approach
based more strongly on transformation seems to require a broader societal debate ﬁrst:
How much are institutions and societies able and willing to change? How can more adap-
tive capacity be built, while at the same time levelling out diﬀerences in capacities between
individuals? What needs to be steered centrally, and what can be decentralized? To answer
these questions, we encourage further research on unpacking the usage of the resilience
concept in ﬂood risk management practice, also in other European contexts. In doing
so, we can learn from the regions of London and Rotterdam and apply ‘sound science’
and ‘joint fact-ﬁnding’ to better understand the meaning-making processes – preferably,
this understanding should stem from collaboration between science and practice.
Note
1. The Thames Estuary 2100 Plan spans across the whole Thames Estuary, from Teddington in
the west to Sheerness/Shoeburyness in the east. Administratively, it belongs to Greater
London, Kent County and Essex County.
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Appendix: Overview policy documents
Thames Estuary 2100 Plan
Reference Document name Access Date Pages
TE2100 Plan TE2100 Plan, Managing ﬂood risk through
London and the Thames Estuary
Public Nov 2012 230
TE2100 Plan, Technical
Report
TE2100 Plan, Technical Report Not public, accessed via EA Apr 2009 384
TE2100 Plan, Technical
Report, Appendix A
TE2100 Plan, Technical Report,
Appendix A, Screening of Options
Not public, accessed via EA Nov 2009 29
TE2100 Plan, Technical
Report, Appendix B
TE2100 Plan, Technical Report,
Appendix B, Costing of Options
Not public, accessed via EA Nov 2009 15
TE2100 Plan, Technical
Report, Appendix D
TE2100 Plan, Technical Report,
Appendix D, The Estuary Wide Options
Not public, accessed via EA Nov 2009 335
TE2100 Plan, Technical
Report, Appendix E
TE2100 Plan, Technical Report,
Appendix E, Land Strategy
Preliminary Assessment
Not public, accessed via EA Dec 2009 47
TE2100 Plan, Technical
Report, Appendix F
TE2100 Plan, Technical Report,
Appendix F, Approach to Adaptation
Not public, accessed via EA Oct 2009 152
TE2100 Plan, Technical
Report, Appendix H
TE2100 Plan, Technical Report,
Appendix H, Appraisal in TE 2100
Not public, accessed via EA Nov 2009 112
TE2100 Plan, Technical
Report, Appendix J1
TE2100 Plan, Technical Report,
Appendix J1, Consultation Phases 1–3
Not public, accessed via EA not dated 18
TE2100 Plan, Technical
Report, Appendix J2
TE2100 Plan, Technical Report,
Appendix J2, Consultation Phase 4
Not public, accessed via EA Oct 2009 33
TE2100 Plan, Technical
Report, Appendix K
TE2100 Plan, Technical Report,
Appendix K, The TE 2100 Studies
Not public, accessed via EA Oct 2009 88
TE 2100 Plan, Technical
Report, Appendix L
TE 2100 Plan, Technical Report,
Appendix L, Climate Change




Thames Estuary 2100, Monitoring of
Key Indicators, Outline Monitoring
Speciﬁcation
Not public, accessed via EA Dec 2011 59
Delta Programme (national and Rotterdam region)
Reference Document name Access Date Pages
DP 2010 The 2011 Delta Programme, Working on the
delta – Investing in a safe and attractive
Netherlands, now and in the future
Public Sep 2010 102
DP 2011 The 2012 Delta Programme, Working on the
delta – Acting today, planning for tomorrow
Public Sep 2011 82
DP 2012 The 2013 Delta Programme, Working on the
delta – The road towards the Delta Decisions
Public Sep 2012 118
DP 2013 The 2014 Delta Programme, Working on the
delta – Promising solutions for tasking and
ambitions
Public Sep 2013 129
DP 2014 The 2015 Delta Programme, Working on the
delta – The decisions to keep the Netherlands
safe and liveable
Public Sep 2014 175













Public Dec 2011 90
Rijnmond-Drechtsteden
2012
Verkenning mogelijke strategieën voor
Rijnmond-Drechtsteden
Public Aug 2012 70
Rijnmond-Drechtsteden
2013
Kansrijke strategieën voor Rijnmond-
Drechtsteden





Public Jun 2014 42
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